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Abstract. As a result of a new definition of safety, whereby the focus on the ability to 
succeed under varying conditions is emphasised, new opportunities for assessing and 
improving safety are being developed. This study investigated both Safety-I and Safety-II 
elements using a focus group method with two expert groups in patient handling. The 
Safety-I and Safety-II elements investigated included potential errors, weak signals and 
learning opportunities arising from these situations.  The weak signals that were 
identified were classified as originating from either an external or internal source. 
Potential learning opportunities to improve signal recognition were identified.  
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1. Introduction- Safety-II and close calls  
 
Preventable adverse medical events, despite large amounts of research available 
(Vincent, 2011), are still a current topic (Dhillon, 2012). In recent years a new definition 
of safety has emerged, resulting in new opportunities for assessing and improving safety. 
The traditional definition of safety (Safety-I) focuses on the occurrence or identification 
of potential or actual adverse outcomes, whereby Safety-II reports the ability to succeed 
under varying conditions so that the number of intended and acceptable outcomes is as 
high as possible (Hollnagel, 2014). As yet, there is a lack of data, literature and methods 
for studying human and organizational performance success as defined by Safety-II 
(Hollnagel, 2014).  
 
One element of Safety-II is the ability to adjust performance to ensure success of the 
task and this requires anticipating, identifying and responding to signals indicating 
changes in the system (Hollnagel, 2014). The signals are often weak and ambiguous, and 
as a result need to be actively sought out (Macrae, 2014a). These weak signals can be 
defined as information, vague in nature, regarding imminent events (Ansoff and 
McDonnell, 1990), which require interpretation and sense-making (Weick, 1995) and in 
order to be meaningful, need to be placed within a frame of reference by processing 
interrelated current events, prior knowledge and future expectations. (Macrae, 2014a, 
2014b). Failure to notice the warning signs and addressing risks promptly can result in 
the risks being normalised, and remaining dormant until an adverse event occurs 
(Macrae, 2014a). This highlights the role that the weak signals can play in safety 
behaviours, but research exploring weak signals and the role it may play in safety, 
especially in health care, is limited. The motivations for this enquiry were to better 
 
 
understand weak signals within a health care context and develop a preliminary 
framework for the initial investigation of weak signals in relation to safety behaviour, 
which is presented Figure 1.  
 
1.1 Framework 
The proposed framework includes the nested structure of the Input-transformation-
output model of health care professional performance (Karsh et al., 2006). In order to 
analyse and understand the work, actions and events in this work system, a systems 
approach needs to be adopted (Karsh et al., 2014). This model was incorporated as a 
general multi-level model of a work system for the framework, in addition to it having 
considered open systems theory and being based on other sociotechnical models, such as 
that proposed by Carayon et al. (2006). During the work process, the worker receives 
signals of different strengths requiring different levels of processing. The processing and 
influence the signs or signals may have on performance of tasks can be explained by the 
skill-rule-knowledge model of behaviour (Rasmussen, 1983). These signs or signals can 
be considered as markers or indicators and can be interpreted as information regarding 
the status of the system and may indicate areas of risk (Macrae, 2014b).  
 
 
 
Figure 1: A proposed framework for the investigation of weak signals in relation to safety 
behaviour. 
 
The purpose of this study was to identify key elements, behaviours and process which 
contribute to the task being completed successfully and safely. Through a focus group 
format and by discussing specific types of tasks and the possible outcomes, it was aimed 
to explore the strategies individuals use to detect, interpret or respond to variations in the 
work environment.  
 
2. Case Study: Patient Handling 
 
The study adopted an explorative qualitative method aimed at investigating weak 
signals in the patient handling field using a focus group methodology. The study 
investigated some of the elements from the proposed framework in Figure 1.  
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A 60 minute focus group was conducted by two investigators (EB, MF) with two 
different expert groups in patient handling. Once an introduction to the research topic had 
been provided, participants were asked to complete a consent form. Following this, basic 
demographic information comprising of the participant’s age, educational degree, 
number of years involved in patient care, the current position held, the current 
responsibilities in this position and number of years in this current position was collected 
using a demographic information form.  
 
The second investigator (MF) presented a scenario where a hospital unit, the staff 
present, the necessary patient handling information (such as the patient’s capabilities) 
and finally the task, which was a patient transfer task, was described. Following the 
description of the task to be considered the second investigator (MF) guided the 
discussion through the following series of questions: 
1. What could go wrong with this task? (Error) 
2. What external factors would influence this task? (External Factors) 
3. How do you know the task is going wrong? (Signals) 
4. Do you use this knowledge next time you do this task? (Learning) 
 
The discussions of the focus group were recorded using two audio recorders and the 
first investigator (EB) recorded field notes. During the discussion the second investigator 
compiled a summary of the key points raised by the group in the discussion on a white 
board or flip chart, which at the end of the session was photographed. The audio data was 
transcribed (EB) and analysed together with the field notes and photographs of the 
summary points made during the discussion. 
 
3. Findings 
 
3.1 Participant Characteristics 
Two focus groups were conducted, one with the Loughborough Alumni Research 
Forum (LARF) in patient handling and one with a group of manual handling advisors at 
the Western General Hospital in Edinburgh. The first group conducted at Loughborough 
Design School at Loughborough University consisted of 10 participants with a mean age 
of 54 years old (±7.69 years), with a mean total of 30 years (±12.14 years) involvement 
in patient care and 10 years (±3.19 years) involvement in the current position. The 
current positions held in the Loughborough group were four manual handling advisors or 
coordinators, five back care advisors or managers and one director manual handling 
consultant.  
 
The second group conducted at Edinburgh Hospital consisted of 7 participants with a 
mean age of 45 years old (±7.17 years), with a mean total of 25 years (±7.95 years) 
involvement in patient care and 11 years (±5.63 years) involvement in the current 
position. The current positions held in the Edinburgh group were two manual handling 
advisors or coordinators, four manual handling area leads and one head of manual 
handling.  
 
3.2 Focus Group Results 
Commonalities between the results for each of the questions investigated within the 
two focus groups could be identified and are presented in this paper. The results for the 
four questions investigated in the focus group sessions are depicted inError! Reference 
source not found. Figure 2. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2: The combined results from the field notes and the discussion-created summary 
for both groups with regards to the five investigated questions from the focus groups. 
 
Common errors were identified for several examples of patient transfer tasks 
including a lateral bed transfer or an assisted transfer from a seated position to a standing 
position. The common errors identified for the task examples included errors relating to 
inappropriate equipment use, lack of teamwork and communication with team members 
or the patient, poor postures, the task preconditions not being met, a lack of knowledge or 
skill and incorrect techniques being applied. The examples of where preconditions were 
not met included brakes on the bed being not applied and attempting the transfer at an 
appropriate bed height. 
 
Potential factors that would influence the task and the task-related behaviour 
identified by both groups included patient dynamics, time and space-related factors, poor 
safety culture as well as staff stress. The one group also included policies as a negative 
external factor from the perspective that policies could lead to a lack of situation 
awareness and risks being normalised and explained away. The same group mentioned 
later then policies needed to be influenced by the learning opportunities described by the 
group. Patient dynamics referred to current health state of the patient as well as the level 
of cooperation they would provide.  
 
The signals that assisted in detecting that an error may occur were identified by both 
groups as either originating externally (from the environment) or internally. The signals 
identified as being internal consisted of trained memory cues, for example a rhyme to 
ensure all safety aspects of the task were completed, individual checks such as those 
develop through personal experience, being less task orientated and more situation aware, 
and questioning actions. By being less task orientated and more situation aware, an 
individual may be more receptive to signals and be more aware of how the task is 
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progressing. Furthermore by questioning actions one would hopefully negate the negative 
effects of habituation such as risks being normalised and explained away. Signals that 
could be considered as originating from the environment include awareness that was 
heighten due to an unfamiliar aspect or element of the task, visual or sensory signals such 
as seeing or feeling that the brakes on the bed were not activated prior to starting the 
transfer and feedback from the patient.  
 
The learning opportunities identified in the focus groups included the need for 
reflection, continuous assessment and for empowerment. By incorporating reflection into 
the work environment, the rest of the team, co-workers or the individual themselves 
would benefit from the experience of learning to recognise signals more readily. 
Continuous assessment may provide the opportunity to identify any signals that may 
originate from the patient or the environment. The need for empowerment would provide 
the opportunity for staff to question actions and potential change the course of action 
based on a signal received.  
 
4. Discussion and Conclusion 
 
Traditional Safety-I element, namely errors and influencing factors were selected to 
initiate the discussion as errors and adverse events are more memorable elements as 
opposed to the tasks that are successfully completed which occurs usually the majority of 
the time. The errors identified were very similar for both focus groups and were related to 
skill, knowledge, equipment misuse, lack of communication, incorrect technique, poor 
postures and preconditions not being full filled. Most of the influencing factors identified 
by the two groups were organizational and managerial in nature such as available 
resources and safety culture. These organizational and managerial factors may not only 
influence the worker, task but also may affect the identification, interpretation and 
response to signals identified.  
 
Two different sources of signals emerged from the discussions and these were 
external, originating from the environment, or internal. These signals may be considered 
as an element of Safety-II in that if resulting action is taken and performance is adjusted 
the task may still be completed successfully. As the triggers or signals are often weak and 
need to be actively sought out and created by processing various forms of information 
(Macrae, 2014a), a key aspect to enhance this would be identifying potential learning 
opportunities so that one could more readily identify these signals. The learning 
opportunities identified in the focus groups included the need for reflection, continuous 
assessment and for empowerment. These suggested learning opportunities mirror the 
proposed means of improving safety with regards to signals by actively producing and 
amplifying siganls, as described by Macrae (2014a). For these learning opportunities to 
be realised one would need ensure that learning and adaptation occurred on numerous 
levels as the organization would need to assist in ensuring that the work environment 
allows for reflection, continuous assessment and empowerment at individual, unit and 
potentially on other levels. Here the organization’s safety culture could have an 
influencing role in providing the potential means of training and ensuring the 
environment is available for identifying these signals.  
 
The method above investigated both Safety-I and Safety-II elements. The Safety-I 
element addressed in this study included potential errors that may result in adverse 
outcomes whereas the Safety-II elements investigated in this study included signals and 
 
 
learning opportunities. These Safety-II elements would assist in improving the ability to 
succeed under varying conditions so that the number of intended and acceptable 
outcomes was as high as possible (Hollnagel, 2014). The proposed framework and 
method provide a preliminary basis for the investigation of weak signals and assists in 
highlighting the role that the weak signals can play in safety behaviour. Further 
investigations are required in order to further identify what type of signals are present in 
tasks as well as identify which influencing factors promote or inhibit signal 
identification.  
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